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Abstract. Recently, information leakage incidents have occurred due to database
security vulnerabilities. The administrators in the traditional database access con-
trol methods grant simple permissions to users for accessing database objects. Even
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though they tried to apply more strict permissions in recent database systems, it
was difficult to properly adopt sophisticated access control policies to commercial
databases due to performance degradations. This paper proposes a database se-
curity system including a database firewall server as an enhanced database access
control system which can efficiently enforce sophisticated security policies to provide
database with confidentiality using a data masking technique for diverse conditions
such as the date, time, SQL string, and table columns to database systems.
Keywords: Database security, privacy, access control, database firewall, data
masking
1 INTRODUCTION
Recently, diverse sensitive information, including personal private information, has
been stored with an increasing frequency in databases [1, 4]. Organizations manage
numerous databases, and their users request information through diverse access
methods to these data.
In databases, diverse access paths to information can enhance usability of the
information, but there is a strong possibility of malicious collection or illegal usage
of the data because probability of information exposure can be increased proportion-
ately. Thus, safe management is necessary for sensitive information in databases.
Several studies are currently being conducted to control accesses and manage
data for database security [3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. The methods
of database security can be divided into two parts [2]: access control/audit me-
thods and data encryption methods. Access control/audit methods look out for
input/output route of the database, and data encryption methods deal with en-
crypted data in databases.
However, those studies have several problems. In the existing studies which use
access control methods, detailed and various access requirements cannot be accom-
modated, and it is not easy to change these requirements when a user’s security
requirements change many times. While current security solutions have several
strong points, they also have weak points such as insufficient confidentiality for
data itself and decreased performance for database security. For example, Oracle 8i
which holds a majority share of the DBMS (Database Management System) market
includes its data encryption module as a default function. However, usage of the
encryption module is very restrictive because of efficiency deterioration. Thus, de-
velopment of information protection technologies for preventing illegal obtaining of
information from inside or outside is urgently required [2]. Owing to the situations
mentioned above, information leakage incidents of databases still occur. In order to
solve this problem, the proposed database security system provides confidentiality
and efficiency in management of integrated security policies, which are needed to
protect data and to satisfy feasibility requirements.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related
works for existing database security methods and their problems, and Section 3
defines several symbols and meanings related to access control policy in detail. Sec-
tion 4 describes the requirements of information user and proposes a new database
security system including database firewall server. Section 5 shows implementa-
tion results, and Section 6 compares the existing models and the proposed model.
Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper and presents future works.
2 RELATED WORKS
On the market, there are several database security solutions, such as ChakraTM [5],
MiddlemanTM [6], DBSaferTM [7], DB-iTM [8] and dGriffinTM [9], which use access
control and audit methods, and Cube OneTM [10], D’AMOTM [11], SafeDBTM [12],
and Secure.DataTM [13], which use data encryption methods. The access control and
audit methods have some merits in that they are able to guarantee the efficiency of
DBMS and are convenient to operate, but data can be disclosed easily when it is
robbed because it is not secured. While data encryption method [14] has a merit
that it is safe, due to encryption, even if data are disclosed, it lowers its efficiency
because it is installed first in DBMS directly and operated.
In addition, a policy-based research [15], which uses both access control mo-
dels [16] with MAC (Mandatory Access Control), DAC (Discretionary Access Con-
trol), RBAC (Role Based Access Control) [3] etc., and data encryption methods [14,
17], is being carried out for controlling access and managing data for database se-
curity. However, this research has the following merits and demerits. First, the
existing research, which uses access control model, manages the user’s access, but
cannot accept detailed and diverse access requests like access control for specific SQL
statements or specific database columns. For example, it is possible to make and
apply the policy that two random users can access the same attribute, but it is hard
to give permission to each tuple of the attribute in the existing models [18]. Also,
modifications are not easy when the user’s security requirements change frequently.
That is, it cannot be dealt effectively that users’ access permissions of random data
change many times. Moreover, the access control by each user cannot be provided
for a piece of data. For instance, a situation can occur in which a user who has
access permission to specific data can give access permission to part of that data to
a user who does not have permission to it.
Among the above-mentioned existing studies for database security systems, a re-
cent study suggests a security system for the various sizes of data group [18]. This
system uses various access control policies, such as MAC, S-DAC (selective DAC),
and RBAC, for protecting data. In ‘Phase1’, first, it examines the user IDs of those
who want access and checks whether the access requirement is a part of the SQL
statement or one of the roles. The system then starts to work according to each
situation. According to the security level or role, access is decided by using the
MAC and RBAC policies, and then in ‘Phase2’, the former phase’s result can be
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filtered selectively again for the various sizes of data groups by using S-DAC policy.
Finally, only the data items which pass all the security policies can be shown to the
user.
3 PRELIMINARY NOTIONS
In our work, we define several symbols and meanings related to access control policy.
First, user Ui is a subject of information accesses and means a user of database.
The data is an object which means set of information and can be defined as data or
a group of data. Security level called SL includes USL (user security level) and DSL
(data security level), and can be defined according to the policy in each organization
and/or system. Detailed expressions and definitions can be described as follows.
Symbols Description
U User set, U = {U1, U2, . . . , Ui}
i User identity
R User role set, R = {R1, R2, . . . , Rj}
j Role identity
SL Security Level set, SL = {SL1, SL2, . . . , SLs}
* User security level USL = {USL1, USL2, . . . , USLs}
* Data security level DSL = {DSL1, DSL2, . . . , DSLs}
s Security level identity
C Column set, C = {C1, C2, . . . , Ct}
t Column identity
N Total number of users
Table 1. Definitions of access control policy symbols
For efficient policy management, prerequisites expression can be defined by using
the above symbols in Table 1 as follows;
• R(Ui) ⊂ Rj
• SL(Ri) ⊂ USLs, SL(Ct) ⊂ DSLs
• SL1 ≥ SL2 ≥ . . . ≥ SLs
• 1 ≤ N(USLs) ≤ i, 1 ≤ N(Rj) ≤ i.
Each user is one of the members for a role, and each role has a USL and data
column has a DSL. In addition, more than one kind of USL or role should exist.
However, only DSL can include the ‘Ø’ (empty set). For each security level ‘s’, lower
number has priority over higher number.
Next, definitions related to the policies for particular condition can be described
as shown in Table 2. The items in Table 2 can be used in defining the policies to
control detailed access. There are several examples to generate policies for detailed
access control as follows:
Condition → subject , object , permission (or operation).














Table 2. Definitions of detailed access control policy symbols
Security level policy table is divided into two parts for efficient retrieval and
process of core data; USL Table (user security level table) for managing user and
DSL Table (data security level table) for managing data. The policies for these
tables can be illustrated as follows.
Policy 1. Basic Security Level Policy
[USLk ≥ DSLi ∩Ri ∈ USLk ∩ Ct ∈ DSLi]→ Ri, Ct, R.
When USLk dominates DSLi, the role ‘Ri’ which is a member or USLk can
‘R(Read)’ a data ‘Ct’ which is a member of DSLi. The permission can be listed
not only as R(Read), but also as I(Insert), U(Update), D(delete). They can be
represented as Ri, Ct, R, I, U , D.
Policy 2. Specific Policy related to particular user or data column for detailed
access control:
• The expression of detailed access control:
Defined item = value.
• The expression of detailed data item for masking:
Columns = (table1 : column1, column2, . . . , columnm),
(table2 : column1, column2, . . . , columnm),
. . .
The detailed access control includes the diverse policies which are related to
detailed items such as IP, Host, DbUser, DbTable, Time, Date, App, LoginUser,
Cmd, DbInst, DbSess, DbSql as defined in Table 2. Masking columns can be divided
into sections by table and they can have policies for each.
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Example 1. We can suppose a scenario to apply the policies given above. A de-
partment has ten users for databases and five roles defined. In this case, user can
be a member of each role as follows;
• U = {Alice, Julie, SCOTT ,Calvin,Cho,Park ,Bob,Lee,Moon,Yim}, i = 10
• R = {admin,manager , employee, customer , guest}, j = 5
• {Kim,Lee} ⊂ admin,
{Alice,Moon, SCOTT} ⊂ manager ,
{Kim,Lee,Alice,Moon, SCOTT} ⊂ employee,
{Yim, Julie} ⊂ guest ,
{} ⊂ customer .
The security levels which are related to the above-mentioned data and users are
defined as the following expressions and also in Figure 1.
• Security Level SL = {SL1, SL2, SL3, SL4}, s = 4
• C = {SSN,Address, Cell}, t = 3
<USL Table> <DSL Table>
Security Level User Role Data Group Name Security Level




SL3 Employee Others(Name, Login Id, Email) SL3SL4 Public
Figure 1. Examples of a USL and a DSL table
According to the mentioned security Policy 1, if a USL is higher than a DSL,
that is, a USL dominates a DSL, the user can be allowed for the data value. For
example, let us suppose that there is a table which has a schema in Table 3.
Id Name SSN Login Id Address Cell Email
1 Alice . . . . . . . . . . . .
2 Bob . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table 3. An example of table schema
When the user ‘SCOTT’ wants to get a result for Name, SSN and Email from
this table through some query, the data value of ‘SSN’ would be shown with masked
result to the user in this proposed system even if the result has these three columns
because the role of ‘SCOTT’ is ‘manager’ and it could not satisfy Policy 1.
R(SCOTT ) = manager ,
USL(manager) = SL2,
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DSL(SSN) = SL1
∴ USL(manager) < DSL(SSN)
On the other hand, MAC (Message Authentication Code) can be used between
application server and proposed system when user has a process to access a database.
If integrity check failed, access to the database can be blocked.
As we mentioned before, the defined policies are used separately from each
database policy. Thus, pre and post process time can be considered; however, mask-
ing method can reduce time more than data encryption method can.
Example 2. We can consider another scenario for Policy 2. With respect to the
table schema in Table 3, the requirements for detailed access control except pre-
defined USL or DLS can be supposed as follows:
“SCOTT can access the CUSTOMER table in database from 9:00 am to
6:00 pm through a PC which is using an IP address ‘192.168.XXX.XXX’ and
named ‘HOSTNAME’. In addition, columns ‘SSN’, ‘ADDRESS’ and ‘MO-
BILE NO’ should be masked in the query result for the user.”
If these detailed access controls are wanted, the policies can be defined as follows:
• Control Expression:
IP = 192.168.XXX.XXX and
Host = HOSTNAME and
DbUser = SCOTT and
DbTable = CUSTOMER and
Time = 09:00 ∼ 18:00
• Masking Columns:
Columns = (CUSTOMER : SSN ,ADDRESS ,MOBILE NO)
When detailed policies are defined as above, if the user ‘SCOTT’ satisfies the
security level policy and detailed access control policies such as IP, Host, DBUser,
DBTable and Time, ‘SCOTT’ can see some results which include masked data such
as SSN, ADDRESS and MOBILE NO.
4 DATABASE SECURITY SYSTEM
This section proposes our access control system to show the secure method when
accesses to databases are requested from a client.
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4.1 Security Requirements
As we mentioned before, the existing database security system for various sizes of
data groups could not cover the aforementioned problems and requirements. Thus,
to solve these problems, the proposed system should satisfy the following require-
ments:
1. confidentiality of data itself
2. effective query and answer for access control
3. integrated management of heterogeneous database policy
4. detailed access control according to the diverse access requirements
5. data processing which is able to do the indexing [19].
Among these, requirement (1) can resolve data confidentiality problem of the
existing database security system, and requirement (2) can resolve system overhead
problem. Moreover, requirement (3) can cover time delay, efficiency, and integrated
management problems, and (4) and (5) can satisfy the requirements of the informa-
tion user. Additionally, this paper applies the proposed framework to a method of
data masking in order to protect data in (1) and makes the data indexing possible
in (5) simultaneously. Moreover, when the data masking method is used, data ac-
quisition time accessed by user to database can be managed effectively; therefore,
(2) can be satisfied. Here, this paper satisfies (4) through packet monitoring, and
all of these processes are designed and implemented by monitoring all the access
to the database to effectively integrate and manage the aforementioned ‘databases
using different policies’ in requirement (3).
4.2 Proposed Database Firewall Server
This paper considers the above ‘4.1 Security Requirements’ and proposes the access
control model, which applies the policy by auditing and analyzing all requested
packets between the client and database. This proposed system controls the access
for various kinds of databases.
The proposed security system is composed of two parts, CAA (Client Authen-
tication Agent) and DFS (Database Firewall Server), as shown in Figure 2.
As shown in Figure 2, the whole architecture is composed of CAA, DFS, ACPR
(Access Control Policy Repository) and database parts. The DFS is physically
placed in front of a database or database farm and controls access to prevent by-
passing.
The CAA in the client removes the Ethernet frame header, TCP header, and IP
header and extracts messages from the packet which passes a client, an application
server, and a database [20]. Here, the message authentication code is generated
and stored from an extracted message in order to verify the integrity, and then the
packet is sent to the database. The DFS catches the packet going to the database
by watching the network and then obtains and analyzes the TCP data part [21, 22].
















Figure 2. Whole structure of a database security system
Through the ‘Packet Analyzer’, the DFS extracts the packet’s aforementioned
headers, such as the Ethernet frame header, TCP header, IP address, and Mac
address from the IP header of the packet, and then checks whether it passed user
authentication.
The policy of access control system is used separately from database permissions.
In addition, the system analyzes data request packets from client to database and
the result packets from database to client and applies the access control policy before
going to database or user.
The server can communicate with client program through two kinds of method;
access for external user via network protocol such as TCP/IP and access for internal
user via BEQ (Bequeath protocol). However, in this paper, we focus on the TCP/IP
for external user. The monitored packet contents are analyzed by using Ethereal [23]
when queries are requested. The analyzed result is based on 100 sample data and,
in case of reply packets, on ‘SELECT’ statements which have column information
as SQL query results.
Figure 3 a) shows a monitoring window where user requests SQL query and re-
ceives result packets by using the ‘Ethereal’ tool while the process is being executed.
As shown in Figure 3 a), the user requests the following SQL query.
SELECT id, name, jumin no, login id, address, mobile no, email addr
FROM Customer
Figure 3 b) shows the result packet for requesting of Figure 3 a) to client. The
packet which has a result from server includes all the data because the policies are
not applied.
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a) b)
Figure 3. SQL query packet capture windows: a) SQL query request packet from user,
b) SQL query result packet from server
Table 4 describes the core part of the packet analysis related to the above figures.
As shown in Figure 3 b) and Table 4, query result packets between server and client
can be analyzed. The proposed system uses a data masking method for each column
to protect data from a user who has lower security level.
Offset Length (byte) Description
offset + 0 2 1) Whole length of TCP Payload.
2) In case of long data, data is fragmented in IP
layer.
offset + 4 2 When the response is sent from database server
to client, if ‘offset + 4’ has value ‘0x06’ and
‘offset + 5’ has value ‘0x04’, then server sends
the result of client query.
offset + 41 1 [Case of SELECT query] Number of column is
assigned for query result.
[Case of DML or DDL] Value ‘0x00’ is assigned.
offset + 46 1 Starting point for column information. Value
‘0x01’ is assigned. Each column information be-
gins with value ‘0x01’.
offset + 85 1 Length of column name.
L→ len(colname)
offset + 86 L Column name.
offset + 85 + L + 9 1 Starting point for the next column information.
Value ‘0x01’ is assigned.
Table 4. The core part of the query result packet from server
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All the accesses from client to database are managed by the ‘Packet Manager’.
In addition, it verifies user authentication and data integrity by using one-way hash
function, message authentication code, session key encryption, and so on. Further-
more, it confirms access control policy for the packet through the ACPR (Access
Control Policy Repository) and applies the policy which is verified by the ‘Query
Analyzer’. It can deny access to the data for unauthorized users. The data which
should be hidden in the database by defined policies can be protected through mask-
ing process in the ‘Data Masker’. After data masking, results are transmitted to
the client. At this time, it can be reasonably assumed that the network between
the DFS and databases (or database servers) is safely protected by using a secure
channel such as SSL.
For detailed access control, the policy can be set according to items such as
IP address, host, database user, database table, time, date, application, login user,
command, database instance, database session, database SQL, and so on. Data
columns which should be masked can be classified and set for each table, and policy
for them can also be set for each table.
5 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROPOSED SYSTEM
In this implementation for the database composition environment, ‘Oracle’, which
is a commercial DBMS, is used, and we can access the Oracle database [24] by using
SQL*Plus [25]. Windows 2000 and Oracle Client Release 9.x version are used for the
client and DFS. In addition, UNIX and Oracle9i Enterprise Edition Release 9.x are
used for the ACPR and object database of control, and Windows 2000 and Visual
C++ 6.0 are used for the development composition environment.
In order to obtain packets and mask data in the network, the ‘Windows Packet
Filter Kit’ developed by Vadim V. Smirnov is used. Windows Packet Filter Kit is
a kind of library which can obtain packets through the NDIS (Network Driver Inter-
face Specification) connecting Windows’s TCP/IP layer and network adapter [26,
27]. In addition, ‘General SQL Parser’ from sqlparser.com is used for parsing the
obtained SQL query [28].
To communicate with client programs, the Oracle server applies accesses accord-
ing to the two separate cases, which are accesses of an external user using TCP/IP
and accesses of an internal user using BEQ. This paper focuses on TCP/IP only as
the accesses of an external user in databases.
This proposed system uses a masking method by column unit to protect data
from unauthorized users according to the result of a query in a packet between
a client and server. This method first analyzes packets of a query received from the
database server and decides whether the data containing them needs to be hidden.
If it needs to be masked, it changes the first character into a ‘*’ mark and the other
characters into a ‘NULL’ string. This is different from the ‘data encryption’ method.
In the case of data encryption, encrypted data can be longer than original data
according to the encryption algorithm. This means that content and length of the
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structured protocol is changed in the Oracle database server. Then, the DFS should
regenerate packets entirely to correspond to the Oracle protocol. Furthermore, pay-
load length information in the TCP header should be changed. Thus, the proposed
system uses the masking method which is more effective in terms of cost, and it is
also more appropriate for the purpose of hiding data column values from unautho-
rized users simply. Figure 4 shows the detailed set of the access control policy and
masking column for access.
Figure 4. An example of access control policy set
As shown in Figure 4, the administrator can set a wanted control part in ‘Pro-
tection Expression’, and the control policy can be set for all items mentioned in
Section 4.2. In the above policy set window, ‘BIRTHDAY’ and ‘CELLPHONE’
among the result data are set for masking. Figure 5 describes the data masking
result for the above policy set.
Figure 5 is a test result for SQL query performance in a client by using
SQL*Plus [25] after applying the proposed security model. For the query result,
‘BIRTHDAY’ and ‘CELLPHONE’ column data changed and are marked with ‘*’
instead of the original personal data.
6 COMPARISON AND EVALUATION
This section compares the existing database security system [18] and the proposed
access control system. The existing database security system for various sizes of
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Figure 5. Execution result of SQL ∗ plus column masking
data groups has several problems, as mentioned, and the proposed method supports
security for data and provides integrated management of databases and detailed








Performance reduction due to the data
en/decryption time
Exist Exist Non-exist
Time delay for policy application Exist Non-exist Non-exist
Confidentiality for data itself Impossible Possible Possible
Integrated management of heterogeneous
database policy
Impossible Possible Possible
Control for specific column of query result Possible Possible Possible
Control for specific time or SQL query Impossible Possible Possible
Data Indexing Possible Possible Possible
Table 5. A comparison between the existing and proposed systems
In Table 5, the first and second items are related to the efficiency of data pro-
cessing. The existing system in [18] and Oracle databases have the data encryption
module internally. So, the performance is not very good; but in the proposed system,
the module for data masking is working independently. So, there is no reduction
of performance. Confidentiality for data is a very important issue to guarantee the
database security because database security is of no significance if it is not ensured.
However, in the existing methods, there are no protections to each data. Therefore,
if packets are stolen while transmitting data, all the packet contents can be exposed.
In the proposed method, data can be hidden through data masking. Thus, contents
of important data can be protected even though the packet is stolen.
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In addition, existing methods take time to data disposal because it should satisfy
three policies through two phases [18] while the proposed model has almost no time
delay because it applies simple masking technique instead of data encryption and
decryption.
In terms of integrated management of a heterogeneous database policy, in the ex-
isting method, permission conflict problem can occur between different databases in
extending permission grant structure. Moreover, integrated policy cannot be applied
because it is given by each database. In the proposed method, independent data
executions are possible because data is operated in front of databases (or a database
farm) directly. Through this physical feature, the extension of permission structure
and integrated management can be possible.
In addition, as shown in the table above, the existing method can control specific
column data by using three kinds of policies (MAC, RBAC, S-DAC), but it cannot
deal with other specific items, such as time or SQL query detail. On the other hand,
the proposed system can apply control not only for specific columns, but also for
the time, SQL, and the user by using packet monitoring. The packet monitoring
method can also be a solution for various access requirements, which is one of the
problems mentioned in the introduction.
Finally, confidentiality of data can be guaranteed when data encryption method
is used, but the time can be delayed for encrypting data. It also makes hard to set
data indexing. To solve this, in terms of data indexing, the former method controls
the access to each column by applying the several kinds of methods, regardless of
data confidentiality assurances. Therefore, data is not encrypted, and data indexing
is possible while the proposed method executes data masking before the data are
transmitted through network. Thus, data confidentiality and data indexing can be
ensured simultaneously even though data is not encrypted.
To examine time delay when data is masked, we have the following experiment
in this paper. The experiment is performed to retrieve data in a table which is
composed of 8 columns; we run it 10 times from 1 000 to 10 000 rows. We have
four data groups to have masking experiment such as no masked data, one-column
masked data, two-column masked data and three-column masked data. To inspect
more diverse cases, we use various data types such as integer type data for col-
umn A, encrypted data for column B and text type data for column C, and each
length averages of data types which would be masked are 14 bytes, 32 bytes and
19.875 bytes. Thus, averages of the masked data length of these data group are
0 bytes for ‘no masked data group’, 14 bytes for ‘column A’, 46 bytes for ‘column
A + column B’, and 65.875 bytes for ‘column A + column B + column C’ for the
experiment.
The results of this experiment with the above data groups are shown in Figure 6.
In Figure 6, the number which is shown on the left side in each group is the
result of masking reply time for ‘No masked data’ and the right side number is for
‘Column A + B + C’. As shown here, on the whole the reply time results of no
masked data are shorter than those of others. However, the reply time is not always
increased in proportion to column size as shown this figure. Even the result of no









































A: Integer data type 
B: Encrypted data type 
C: Text data type 
 
Figure 6. Reply time graph for each masked column group
masked data takes a longer time than that of others in this graph. It means that
the reply time is not affected much by masking.
In addition, the detailed access control is possible such as access time, particular
SQL control, and permission grant of the result rows and etc., because this system
is placed in front of the target databases or a database farm, and extension or
integration management of the permission structure can be performed effectively
since policy grant and management are separated from the database.
Table 6 shows the access control state according to the permission in the databa-
se for the existing database security system and the proposed system. We generate
a random database login account and SQL queries and check several security re-
quirements. In this table, ‘O’ means that the access can be controlled for each SQL
query operation, and ‘X’ means that it cannot be controlled.
As shown in Table 6, the existing system cannot control the security require-
ments regardless of whether user is authorized or unauthorized. However, the pro-
posed system can control it precisely. Particularly in the requirement ‘Access by
time slot’, access is controlled accurately for the data, except the time assigned by
each user. The data masking can also be performed if common query access that is
controlled by the column is impossible in the proposed system.
Table 7 compares the advantages and disadvantages of the related commercial
solutions.
As shown in Table 7, first, in case of the access control and/or auditing method
used in ChakraTM, MiddlemanTM, DBSaferTM, DB-iTMand dGriffinTM, there are
several merits such as no performance degradation and user management function
while secure data management is not possible. Second, in case of data encryption
method using in Cube OneTM, D’AMOTM, SafeDBTM, and Secure.Data, data is
relatively secure while there is some burden to manage the data. Finally, in case




Existing System [18] Proposed System
Common Target Common Target
column column column column
Common access
AU X X X X
UAU O X O O
Access by time slot
AU X X X X
UAU X X O O
Access by DB account
theft
AU X X O O
UAU X X O O
Access by IP address theft
AU X X O O
UAU X X O O
Control column access for
data masking
AU X X X O
UAU X X X O
AU: Authorized User, UAU: Unauthorized User





















Data security is im-
possible. Detailed ac-
cess is not allowed
for specific column or
low. Dynamic access








Data security of itself
is guaranteed. ([5, 8])
Performance of










exist. User can select
encryption method
and key. ([29, 30])
Encryption or mask-
ing function performs
in the system inside.
Performance can be
reduced. ([29, 30])
Table 7. Comparison of dis/advantage according to the related commercial solutions
of Oracle supporting diverse data protection method, there are some good features
which are diverse methods to use data and key. The solution is composed of software
type, and the data encryption or masking is internally executed in the system. Thus,
it is not used widely because it may decrease the effectiveness [29].
1208 E.-A. Cho, Ch.-J. Moon, D.-H. Park, K.-B. Yim
7 CONCLUSION
Recent research on security systems for various sizes of data groups focused on
several requirements related to data size. However, it could not assure data confi-
dentiality in databases. In addition, in defining data groups, overhead could occur,
and adding the policy could also cause a decrease of performance efficiency and du-
plication of the policy. Moreover, integrated management would not be possible for
various databases.
Thus, in this paper, the database firewall server was proposed to solve these
problems by providing confidentiality, performance efficiency, and integrated ma-
nagement for enforcing security policies. The proposed security system uses the
authentication method to prevent the alteration of the accessed user information to
the database and exchanges the encrypted SQL authentication code between CAA
and DFS to ensure the integrity of the requested SQL from the client. In addition,
it reduces the inconvenience of SQL generation owing to the strong access control
policy by each column and implements the data masking technique for data access
according to the permission.
Thus, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. Confidentiality for data and effective data processing.
2. Effective Query and Answer performance for access control.
3. Integrated management for heterogeneous database policies.
4. Detailed access control according to diverse access requirements.
5. Indexable data processing.
First, this proposed system can protect the data and make an index by using
data masking method at the same time. Also, user can manage the time to access
databases and obtain the data with this data masking method. Here, we used
a packet analyzing method by monitoring. So, detailed access control is possible at
the packet level. In addition, all these processes are based on the reference monitor
model. So, we designed and implemented that this proposed system can monitor
entire access to the databases in order to manage the heterogeneous databases, which
may have different policies, efficiently and integratively. Therefore, the proposed
system can control the user access in detail and the data masking module and
masking data decision module is implemented separately. So, it can reduce the time
delay to apply policies including the changed policies dynamically. Moreover, our
system can protect the data from the attack caused by undefined access because it
can manage all requests from user applications to databases through the reference
monitor.
For future research, we need to build a standardized access control policy which
can be applied to all databases regardless of the type. Furthermore, we need to
analyze the protocol in more detail for strong access control. In addition, we need
to study effective management for access control policies when the databases for
audit or management are increased.
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